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I. INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 34( c) and 3 5( c), Appellant Augusta Sayoko Mimoto 
GreenheaIi ("GreenheaIi") submits tIlls Reply Brief in rebuttal to the arguments and additional 
issues raised by Jay BrO\vn and CIn-istine Hopson-Brown ("Respondent") in their Respondent's 
Brief filed on January 9, 2014. Greenheart incorporates the statement of the course of proceedings 
and facts in its opening brief here. As set f01ih in the Appellant's Brief and tIlls Rep(v Brief, the 
district court's judgment refonning the Warranty Deed in tllls case should be vacated. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Vacating The District Court's Judgment Regarding Mistake 'Vill Simultaneously 
Overturn the Judgment Regarding Quasi-Estoppel and \Vaiver. 
The Browns argue that the equitable theories of quasi-estoppel and waiver discussed in 
the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law provide and independent basis to 
sustain the district comi's Final Judgment. Moreover, the Browns argue that since Greenheart 
did not appeal that portion of the district court's decision regarding quasi-estoppel and waiver 
this Court does not need to address Greenheart's arguments on whether the district court erred in 
allowing the case to proceed on the issue of mutual mistake. The Browns' argument on this 
issue has no merit because: (1) if this Court determines that the district comi erred in allowing 
the case to be tried on mistake, the district court's decision on quasi-estoppel and waiver would 
likewise be automatically vacated because 'extrinsic evidence' of post-sale conduct would have 
been barred by the parol evidence rule; and (2) the equitable theories of quasi-estoppel and 
waiver alone are not the correct equitable theories to refonn a deed. 
Here, the Browns introduction of extrinsic evidence to change the unambiguous language 
of the Warranty Deed was only made possible because the district court allowed the Browns to 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 1 
litigate the issue of mistake. This Court has recognized that "[it] is an elementary rule for the 
construction of deeds, the language of which is plain and unambiguous, that. in the absence of 
fraud or mistake. the intention of the parties must be ascertained from the instrument 
itself.. .. Parol evidence is not admissible for such purpose:' Kool1 v. Empey, 40 Idaho 6, 231 P. 
1097. 1098 (1924) (underlining added). The extrinsic evidence such as Greenehart's and Jay 
Brown's post-sale conduct to the Elmore County Assessor not only laid the foundation for the 
district court to conclude that a mistake between the parties had occurred, it was the sole basis the 
district court used to justify its decision on quasi-estoppel and \vaiver. See. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law [R. Vol. III, 559-562]. Thus, had the Browns been precluded from litigating 
mistake, the extrinsic evidence of post-sale conduct vv'ould have been precluded by the parol 
evidence rule and there \vould have been no evidentiary basis for the district court to find 
mistake, quasi-estoppel or waiver. 
Based on the analysis above, it was not necessary for Greenheart to address the merits of 
the district court's decision on quasi-estoppel and waiver in her appeal. The legal theory of 
mistake was the 'Trojan Horse' that allovv'ed Brown to introduce extrinsic evidence of post-sale 
conduct to support their quasi-estoppel and waiver causes of action. If this Court vacates the 
district court's judgment as to mistake (on any of the grounds raised by Greenheart in her 
appeal), the remainder of the judgment dealing with quasi-estoppel and waiver should likewise be 
vacated. 
Secondarily, the equitable theories of quasi-estoppel and waiver that the Browns rely on 
are not the correct legal theories for refonning the Warranty Deed's language to state that ground 
water rights were excluded. Courts have used rescission and refonnation where they have found 
mistake in a contract. See. Thieme v. Worst, 113 Idaho 455, 745 P.2d 1076 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Mutual mistake has also been recognized to be the basis to reform a warranty deed. See. 
Barnhardt v. Hansen, 36 Idaho 419, 211 P. 438 (1922); .Moore v. ~Mullen, 123 Idaho 985, 855 
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P.2d 70 (1993); Hughs v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 129 P.3d 1223 (2006). Quasi-estoppel and 
waiver have not been used to reform a deed. The use of those legal theories to reform the 
'Varranty Deed have no application in this case the same as if the Brovms tried to use specific 
performance to require Greenheart to execute a new instrument conveying ground water back the 
themselves. As such, quasi-estoppel and wai\'er alone cmmot be a basis for a judgment ordering 
reformation of the Wananty Deed in this case. 
B. The Browns Misapply The Standard For Determining Accrual of Their Quiet 
Title Action Under Idaho Code Section 5-224's Four Year Limitations Period. 
The Browns inconectly apply the language ofIdaho Code § 6-401 to mean that Section 
6-401 determines when a quiet title cause of action accrues for purposes of applying the statute 
oflimitations. Section 6-401 reads: 
An action mav be brought bv anv person against another 
\);,1ho claims an estate or interest in real or personal propertv 
adverse to him. for the purpose of detennining such adverse 
claim, provided that all actions to adjudicate water rights 
and obtain a decree as to water source, quantity, point of 
diversion, place of use, nature of use, period of use, and 
priority as against other water users shall be brought under 
the provisions of chapter 14, title 42, Idaho Code. 
Idaho Code § 6-401 (underlining added). According to the Browns, the underlined language 
above establishes an, "adverse claim standard" for detennining when their cause of action 
accrues. Specifically, the Browns point to the date at which Greenheart filed a Notice of Claim 
of Ownership with the Idaho Department of Water Resources ("IDWR"). The Browns are 
inconect. 
Under Idaho law, a cause of action generally "accrues," and the statute of limitations 
begins to run, when a party may maintain a lawsuit against another. Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc., 
103 Idaho 912, 915, 655 P.2d 119,122 (Cl. App.1982). This Court has been more than clear that 
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accrual does not occur until damages are incurred: " ... we have never held that a statute of 
limitations may run before an aggrieved party suffers damages. The authority to do so is highly 
doubtful, since it is axiomatic that a party has no right to sue for damages until actual injury 
occurs. Corbridge 1'. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85,88-89,730 P.2d 1005,1008-09 (1986). 
Here, the Browns' quiet title action seeks to detemline who the legal owner of the ground 
water rights is. Since Idaho lav,' holds that water rights pass with the conveyance ofland (unless 
water rights are expressly reserved) Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 803, 241 P.3d 972, 976 
(2010), the statute of limitations accrued at the time the Wananty Deed was executed by the 
Brmvns, not \vhen Greenheart filed a Notice of Claim of Ownership with the IDWR. The 
Brovms' "injury or damage" (i.e. the loss of their \vater right) occuned at the conveyance of the 
real property. 
If this Court were to adopt the Browns' position that the statute of limitations ran \vhen 
Greenheart filed her Notice of Claim of Ownership with IDWR, it would create a 'discovery 
rule' exception to the statute of limitations which has never been applied to this type of case. 
Generally there is no 'discovery rule' exception to the rumling of the statute oflimitations except 
in specific cases that have been set forth by the Idaho Legislature. For example, an action for 
mistake or fi:aud does not accrue until the discovery of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. 
See. I.e. § 5-218. Likewise, there is a discovery rule exception in foreign object and fraudulent 
concealment cases. See. I.C. § 5-219(4). There is however, no equivalent Idaho statute or 
reported Idaho appellate decision applying a discovery rule exception to a quiet title action to 
interpret the language of a wananty deed. 
When the Browns executed the Wananty Deed transfening the real property to 
Greenheart on January 29. 2007, the ground water rights were transfened to Greenheart as well. 
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The Browns at that point would have suffered an injury because Greenheart now owned a 
portion of their ground \vater rights. At that point the Browns' cause of action accrued because 
they could have filed their declaratory/quiet title action against Greenheart the very next day 
seeking to undo the ground water rights transfer. Instead, the Browns waited more than four 
years to bring this lawsuit filing their Complaint on April 5, 2012. [R. Vol. I, p. IIJ, which is 
beyond the statutory limitations contained in Idaho Code § 5-224. 
C. The Browns Lawsuit based upon Mutual Mistake is Barred by the Three Year 
Statute of Limitations Contained in Idaho Code Section 5-218. 
The Browns argue that to the extent that their argument is based upon mutual mistake, 
their claims "vere brought within tln-ee years of their discovery constituting the mistake. 
Hoyvever, the Browns' analysis on this issue merely restates the District Court's conclusion that 
the Wananty Deed could not have reasonably put the Browns on notice that the use of the 
general appurtenancy clause would convey water rights. The Browns how'ever fail to adequately 
rebut the case law and policy arguments in Greenheart's opening brief 
The Browns fail to refute Greenheart's citation to, and reliance upon, this Court's holding 
in Nancy Lee l<v1ines, Inc. v. Harrison, 95 Idaho 546, 511 P.2d 829 (1973). As discussed in 
Greenheart's opening brief, the Nancy Lee ."A.1ines decision held that the means of knowledge \vas 
the equivalent of actual knowledge. 
As noted in I.C. § 5-218, the statute does not begin to run in fraud cases 'until the 
discovery' of the fraud. However, actual knowledge of the fraud will be infened if the 
allegedly aggrieved party could have discovered it by the exercise of due diligence. It is 
unnecessary to consider the issue of whether or not there was any fraud (actual or 
constructive) in this case. If there was any fraud it could have been discovered in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence at the time it was alleged to have been cOlmnitted. 
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The reasomng of the Washington Supreme Court 111 Davis v. Hanison [25 
Wash.2d 1, 167 P.2d 1015 (1946)J is applicable in this case: 
We hold that this action \:vas balTed by the three year statute 
of limitations, whether appellants had actual knO\vledge of 
the various transactions or not, for the reason that the facts 
were open and appeared upon the records of the 
corporation, subject to inspection by stockholders. 
stockholders failed to examine the corporate records. they 
must have been negligent and careless of their own 
interests. The means ofkno\vledge \vere open to them. and 
means of knowledge are equivalent to actual knowledge. 
Id. (underlining and bolding added), 
In this case, nothing has changed factually :Ii-om the time the Browns executed the 
Wananty Deed until the time that they consulted with an attomey. Nothing prevented the 
Browns from reading the Wananty Deed. In fact, nothing prevented the Browns from consulting 
an attorney prior to, or even after, signing the \Vananty Deed. Rather than re-state her 
arguments, Greenheart respectfillly directs this Court to Greenhemi's analysis and discussion on 
pages 19-23 of Appellant's Brief- whether the Browns, in the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered the mistake at the time they executed the Wananty Deed. 
It should be noted that Greenheart's Appellant's Brief also argued, in the alternative, that 
the statute of limitations for mistake could accrued on 1\\70 other occasions: (1) the mistake could 
have been discovered at the time the Purchase and Sale Agreement was signed; and (2) the 
mistake could have been discovered is when the Elmore County Assessor's office levied 
Greenheart's property as "inigated" ground. The Browns provide no argument or authority 
explaining why this Court should not adopt either of those instances discussed in Greenheart's 
brief as the date the Browns could have discovered the mistake. 
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Lastly, as set forth in page 23 of Appellant's Brief, policy considerations weigh heavily 
against this Court affirming the District Comi's conclusion that the Browns' cause of action for 
mistake accrued when they spoke to an attorney. See. pp. 22-23 of Findings of Fact COl1clusiol1S 
Lmv and Directions For Emry Judgment: [R. Vol. III, pp. 558-559]. Based on the district 
court's holding the time period of discovery could continue for decades before an aggrieved party 
speaks to an attorney. This would create a scenario where causes of action could sit dormant for 
decades until a party speaks \\'ith legal counsel who alerts them to a possible cause of action. 
The evidence produced at trial demonstrated that the Browns could have retained an attorney as 
easily as they retained a real estate agent and title company. Although Idaho does not require 
pmiies to a real estate transaction to consult \\'ith an attorney, parties should not be allowed to 
suspend the running of the statute of limitations on a claim of mistake just because they didn't 
know what the law was. The relevant inquiry is \vhether the Browns could have discovered the 
mistake in the exercise of reasonable diligence. This Court should hold, as a matter of law that 
the statute of limitations started when the Browns executed the \ValTanty Deed because the 
means of knowledge \vere open to them to discover the mistake. 
D. The Issue of The Browns Being Negligent In Reviewing The \Varranty Deed was 
Raised at the Trial Court Level. 
The Browns argue that this Court should disregard Greenheart's argument and analysis 
on the issue of the Browns' negligence because it is raised for the first time on this appeal. The 
Browns are incolTect. 
"To properly raise an issue on appeal there must either be an adverse ruling by the court 
below or the issue must have been raised in the court below, an issue cannot be raised for the first 
time on appeal. Gamer v. Bartschi,139 Idaho 430, 436, 80 P.3d 1031, 1037 (2003) quoting 
McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 397, 64 P.3d 317,323 (2003). 
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Greenhemi raised the issue of negligence below in her proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law (a fact the Respondent's Brief acknmvledges). See Defendant'S First 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; Defendant's First Amended Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, [R. Vol. II, 468 and 502]. The district cOUli expressly 
addressed negligence when it held: 
It is clear from the evidence that the Browns read the \Varranty 
Deed before they signed the deed but did not attach the weighty 
legal significance to three words "with their appurtenances" that 
these words actually carry. They obtained the assistance of a 
licensed realtor to assist with the sale and the assistance of a 
professional title company to assist in the document preparation. 
The Defendant \vould like for this court to rule that not 
understanding these three \\'ords was "negligence" or that not 
obtaining legal counsel to provide advice on its legal significance 
was "negligence." Although many states require licensed legal 
advice before a real estate closing, this court will not hold that to be 
the law in Idaho or find that the absence of legal advice at closing 
is negligence per se. This is not an issue of ,Tegligence but rather 
whether the Browns could have discovered the mistake in the 
exercise of due diligence. 
fR. Vol. III, p. 557] (italics in original). 
The only basis for the Browns' argument that negligence is raised for the first time on 
appeal is their belief that had Greenheart intended to raise the issue of negligence, the record 
would have been more 'fully developed' on the theories of negligence. Respondent's Brief pg. 
29. W11ether the record contains fully developed arguments from Greenheart is irrelevant to 
answering the question of whether the issue of negligence was raised. The Browns simply 
cannot refute that the record on appeal shows that Greenheart submitted negligence in her 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. [R. Vol. II, 468 and 502] and received an 
adverse ruling from the district court per the quoted language above. Since Greenheart raised 
. negligence below, this Court may consider her arguments discussed in her Appellant's Brief 
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E. The Browns' Negligence Precludes Their Use of Mistake To Reform The 
'Varranty Deed. 
TIle Browns argue that the district court properly concluded that they were not negligent in 
reviewing the Vlammty Deed. The Browns submit that the only way for this COLUt to oveltLli1l that 
decision is for Greenheart to show that tilere was no substantial and competent evidence in the 
record to SUppOlt that conclusion because the question of negligence is a question of fact. That 
argument is itlcOlTect and fails to recognize tilat tile Appellant's Brief (pages 24-26) raises the issue 
whether the Browns' negligence bars them from USitlg mistake to reform tile Wammty Deed as a 
matter of law. 
Greenheart's discussion of the BrO\vns' negligence stems from Greenhealt's citation to tilis 
Court's holding in Jensen v. McConnell Bros. et aI, 31 Idaho 87, 169 P. 292 (1917). The Jensen 
decision stands for the rule of law that a palty will not be relieved from the tenns of a contract on the 
ground of mistake due to that party's own negligence. Jensen at 169 P. 292, 293. Like the 
respondent itl Jensen. the Browns could have inselted exclusionary language itltO the \ValTanty Deed 
to protect their interest itl the ground water rights. Moreover, like the respondent itl Jensen the 
Browns read the WalTallty Deed placed ill front of them, See. Finding of Fact No. 17; [R. Vol. III, 
546] and each testified that they signed the Wanallty Deed [Trallscript of Mal-ch, 2013: Tr. p.136, 11. 
15-25 alld p. 278, ll. 18-21] so each could plainly see that exclusionary lallguage was missitlg. 
Failitlg to do so was negligent and therefore the district court should have concluded that the Browns 
could not use mistake to refonn the \ValTallty Deed. 
F. Neither Party Raised Mistake In Their Pleadings And Therefore The District 
Court Should Not Have Allowed The Browns To Litigate That Issue At Trial. 
TIle Browns argue that the issue of mistake was properly before the district because both 
parties raised the issue of mistake in theit' pleaditlgs and the result ill this case would have been the 
same had the court allowed an amendment under LR.C.P. 15(b). The Brovms are wrong because: 
(1) the record on appeal demonstrates that the Browns did not intend to rely on mutual mistake as 
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part of their lawsuit: (2) Greenheart did not try the issue of mistake expressly or by implication; and 
(3) the Complaint v;as not amended to confonn to the evidence at trial. 
1. Mutual mistake was not one of the Browns' legal theories. 
The BrO\vns never intended to rely on the theory of mistake to get the relief they sought in 
this lawsuit. On appeal, the Browns provide no argument or explanation to Greenheart's 
assertions (Appellant's Brief at pages 8-13) that if the Browns had in fact plead mistake. why did 
their legal counsel make no mention or argument of mistake in their written and oral arguments 
on summary judgment? During oral argument on Greenheart's the motion in limine and cross 
motions for summary judgment, counsel for Greenheart once again reiterated that the Browns had 
not plead mistake in the Complaint: 
Mr. Villegas: If you don't exclude water from the deed, the 
water goes with the land. That's what our courts have held. 
And, of course, again, the Empey case, absent fraud or 
mistake. And there's been no alle£ations of fraud or 
mistake in this case, and there have b;en no allegations of 
mistake in this case, which has to be specifically pled. 
[Transcript of January 2013; Tr. p. 20, 11. 6012]. 
Browns' counsel never stated on rebuttal that the Browns were relying on mistake as one 
of their theories. Just like the Complaint, the Browns' counsel remained silent at that hearing on 
the issue of whether they in fact were relying on mistake as one of their causes of action. Had the 
Browns truly intended to rely on mistake, their arguments in support of their summary judgment 
would have incorporated that legal theory. For example, the Browns argued on summary 
judgment that extrinsic evidence should be considered by the district court because the language 
of the Warranty Deed was ambiguous. See. Memorandum In Support of Motion For Summary 
Judgment, p. 13: [R. Vol. 1, p. 136]. Not once did the Browns argue that extrinsic evidence 
should be considered because a mistake between the parties had occurred. That did not happen in 
this case because the Browns were not relying on mistake as one of their legal theories. 
The language of the Complaint itself suggests that the Browns specifically plead legal 
theories to the exclusion of mistake. The Appellant's Brief cites and discusses AMCO Insurance 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 10 
v. Tri-Spur In1'. Co. 140 Idaho 733. 101 P.3d 226 (2004) for the rule of law that when a 
complaint is specifically drafted to include specific claims and remedies. the party that drafted 
the complaint is not allowed to assert more claims that vvere excluded from the complaint. 
A"~1CO Ins. Co. 1'. Tri-Spur b11'. Co., 140 Idaho 733, 738-739,101 P.3d 226,231 - 232 (2004). 
The Browns fail to adequately address Greenheart's analysis of AMCO in footnote 5 to the 
Respondent's Brief by attempting to dismiss the holding as being inapposite because AMCO 
involved an insurance contract in an insurance defense case. That distinction has no legal 
significance to the rule of la\v set forth in AlviCO. 
The AMCO case involved a declaratory action filed by an insurance company seeking a 
declaration from the court that the insurance policy's exclusion for bodily injury arising out of 
civil rights violations barred business liability coverage for claims against the insured for 
violation of Title VII. !d at 140 Idaho 227-228. The insured argued that although the claims and 
relief in the complaint were based on Title VII, the facts also revealed potential causes of action 
for assault, battery, false imprisonment, slander and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. 
at 140 Idaho 231. The AMCO court disagreed with the insured's argument holding that the 
complaint v,:as very specific that it only sought claims and remedies arising under Title VII. !d. at 
140 Idaho 232. 
In this case, the Browns' Complaint [R. Vol. I, 11] plead specific claims and remedies to 
the exclusion of any mutual mistake theory. Specifically, the Browns sought to quiet title to the 
disputed ground water rights through a declaratory action to interpret the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement and to interpret the Warranty Deed. See Count 1 to Complaint [R. Vol. I, 17]. Count 
2 of their Complaint sought equitable relief stating that Greenheart knew or should have known 
that the property was being sold as dry land with no water rights. See Count 2 to Complaint [R. 
Vol. I, 18]. The Complaint fails to identify 'mistake' by name or count. The Browns cannot 
credibly argue that they intended to use the theory of mutual mistake as a basis for relief and that 
they put Greenheart on notice that "mistake" was at issue. 
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2. Greenheart did not try the issue of mistake. 
Greenheart did not try the issue of mistake by express or implied implication at any time 
during the course of these proceedings. See. Appellant's Brief pp. 15-17. Greenheart did 
everything she could to object. Greenheart's pleadings in opposition to Browns' motion for 
summary judgment and pleadings on her motion to strike were premised on the fact that the 
Browns did not allege fraud or mistake and therefore the extrinsic evidence offered in support of 
Browns' motion for smlli11ary judgment was barred by the parol evidence rule. Greenheart's 
memorandum opposing the Browns' motion for summary judgment stated: 
More importantly, the exception to the parol evidence rule 
(fraud or mistake) that would permit the introduction of 
extrinsic evidence has never been pled by Browns. 
Brown's Complaint does not allege fraud or mistake and 
certainly does not meet I.R.c.P. 9(b) requirinQ: that fraud or 
mistake be pled with particularity. As a result, the extrinsic 
evidence Brown attempts to introduce (which Greenheart 
currently challenges in her motion to strike filed 
concurrently) as the foundation for their motion cannot be a 
basis for granting summary judgment. 
See Memorandum in Opposition to Plaint(ffs' Motion for Summary Judgment pp. 5-6; [R. Vol. II. 
pp.290-291]. Greenheart likewise argued in her Reply Memorandum [12 Support of Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment [R. Vol. II, p. 343] that "Brown has not alleged fi-aud or mistake 
that would allow the introduction of extrinsic evidence to change the express intent in the 
Warranty Deed." [R. Vol. II, p. 345]. Greenhearfs arguments on both of these briefs are a clear 
expression by Greenheart that mistake was not plead by the Brmvns and that Greenheart did not 
try the issue of mutual mistake by express consent or by implication. 
Based on the analysis above and the arguments contained m her Appellant's Brief, 
Greenheart respectfully requests that this Court hold that neither party raised the issue of mistake 
before the district court. The theory of mistake was raised sua sponte by the district court forcing 
Greenheart to litigate a legal theory that the Browns did not ask for. 
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3. Greenheart was prejudiced by the district court raising raising the issue 
a/mistake sua sponte. 
The Browns argue that it makes no difference that the district court denied Greeneharf s 
Motion 111 Limine and Motion to Strike because it would not have been different had the district 
court granted a motion to amend the pleadings under LR.C.P. lS(b). The flaw in the Browns' 
argument however is they did not move to amend pursuant to I.R.c.P. lS(b) after trial to conform 
the pleadings to the evidence. Therefore, I.R.C.P. lS(b) is inapplicable to this appeal. 
Iv10reover, assuming arguendo that the Browns had amended their Complaint to conform 
to the evidence under LR.C.P. lS(b), it does not cure the district court's abuse of discretion to 
force Greellheart to defend against a cause of action that the Browns did not intend to litigate. 
Cases discussing due process and the need for an impartial tribunal are instructive to addressing 
the error in this appeal. 
"The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal." 
Davisco Foods Intern. v. Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784. 791 118 P.3d 116, 123 (200S) citing 
A1arshall v. ferrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 100 S.c.T. 1610 (1980). The meaning of "impartiality" as it 
is used in the context of applying the Due Process Clause to judges means "the lack of bias for or 
against either party to the proceeding. Impartiality in this sense assures equal application of the 
law. That is it guarantees a party that the judge who hears his case will apply the law." Marcia 
T Turner, L.L.C v. City o/THin Falls, 144 Idaho 203,209, IS9 P.3d 840,846 (2007). Likewise, 
criminal cases speaking to the topic of a judge suggesting a tactic to a prosecutor is instructive. 
In Robinson v. u.s., S13 A.2d 218, 222 (D.C.,1986) the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
held that it was improper for the trial court to suggest a tactical course. The Robinson court 
wrote " ... [t]he court went further, however, and suggested to the prosecutor a tactical course 
which he had not considered. This was improper. The trial court 'must not take on the role of a 
APPELLANT' S REPLY BRIEF - 13 
partisan .... Prosecution and judgment are two separate functions in the administration of justice; 
they must not merge." !d. 
Here, Greenheart was clearly prejudiced in this matter not just in her ability to prepare a 
defense, but prejudiced in allowing the Brov,:ns to proceed on a claim that they did not ask for. 
This is especially problematic since the district court was the finder of fact. Courts are not in the 
business of telling a plaintiff \\'hat legal theories it should litigate. The district court elTed in 
suggesting a tactical course that the Browns had not thought of by forcing the parties to litigate 
the issue of mistake. 
G. The Brovms' Complaint Did Not Meet Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) 
Requiring That Mistake Be Plead \Vith Particularity. 
The Browns argue that all their Complaint complied with the pleading requirements of 
LR.C.P. 9(b) because all the Complaint needed to do was plead the "circumstances" constituting 
the mistake with particularity. Respondent's Brie.fpg. 31. The Browns' interpretation ofLR.C.P. 
9(b) does not comport with appellate decisions explaining what it means to "plead with 
particularity. " 
On this issue, Greenheart's Appellant's Brief cites and discusses the holding of Strate v. 
Cambridge Telephone Co., Inc., ll8 Idaho 157, 161,795 P.2d 319,323 (Ct. App. 1990), wherein 
the Court of Appeals held that a complaint did not meet the pleading requirements of LR.C.P. 
9(b) that fraud be plead with particularity because: (1) the complaint did not mention fraud by 
name and (2) the plaintiff failed to allege one of the elements of fraud. See Appellant's Briefpgs. 
13-14. Interestingly, the Respondent's Brie.ffails to rebut the Strate decision and explain why the 
Complaint in this case should not suffer the same fate as the complaint in Strate. 
A "mistake is an unintentional act or omission arising from ignorance, surpnse, or 
misplaced confidence." Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639, 671 P.2d 1099, 1102 eCt. App. 
1983). A mutual mistake occurs when both parties share a misconception about a vital fact upon 
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which they based their bargain at the time of contracting. Id The mistake must be material or. in 
other words. so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties. ld 
In this case. similar to the complaint in the Strate v. Cambridge case, the Browns' 
Complaint suffers from the same pleading deficiencies. First. the Complaint does not use the 
\vord 'mistake,' 'mutual mistake,' or any words synonymous with mistake and therefore mistake 
was not identified by name in the Complaint. [R. Vol. I, p. 11]. Second, a review of the 
Complaint shmvs that none of the allegations detail with particularity (1) what the mistake or 
common misconception was: and (2) how or \vhy the mistake was so substantial and fundamental 
that it defeated the object of the parties. It cannot be said that the Browns' Complaint plead 
mistake with particularity. Since mistake was not properly plead, the district court erred in 
allowing the Browns to litigate the issue of whether there was a mutual mistake. 
H. \Vhether The Purchase and Sale Agreement \Vas Ambiguous Is Material To This 
Appeal. 
The Browns argue that since the district court allowed evidence of mistake. this Court's 
interpretation of paragraph 16 of the Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) is immaterial to the 
outcome of this case. The Browns are incorrect because if this Court determines that the 
language of the PSA unambiguously states that water was included in the sale of the property, the 
remaining extrinsic evidence submitted to prove mistake is insufficient to meet the Browns' 
burden of proof. 
"The burden of proof is on the party alleging mutual mistake." Udelavitz v. Ketchen, 33 
Idaho 165, 190 P. 1029 (1920). In order to prove mistake, "[t]he evidence must be clear and 
satisfactory, leaving but little, if any, doubt of the mistake. It must be made out by the clearest 
and most satisfactory testimony such as to leave no fair and reasonable doubt on the mind that the 
writing does not correctly embody the real intention of the parties. A mere preponderance of the 
evidence will not suffice ... " Id In this case, the plain language of the terms of the Purchase and 
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Sale Agreement state that \vater \vas included in the sale of the property. The Purchase and Sale 
Agreement specifically reads: 
16. \VATER RIGHTS: Description of water rights. water 
systems, wells springs, wateL ditches, ditch rights, etc. if 
any, that are appurtenant thereto that are no\v on or used in 
connection with the premises and shall be included in the 
sale unless othenvise provided herein: [blank] 
See Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 in Clerk's Exhibits on Appeal; [R. Vol. I, pp. 114-120]. If this 
Court agrees \vith Greenehart's analysis, the evidence of the parties' intent, as expressed in the 
PSA to include water rights in the sale overshadows the significance of all the other evidence 
introduced by the Browns to prove mistake. For example. the extrinsic evidence of Greenheart' s 
communications \vith the Elmore County Assessor, Jay Brown's letter to the Elmore County 
Assessor, the multiple listing advertisement and the property condition disclosure form. \vhen 
vievved as a v,hole, cam10t sustain a finding of mutual mistake by clear and convincing evidence. 
Therefore, this Court's analysis of the PSA is necessary for purposes of this appeal to vacate the 
district court's judgment. 
I. The District Court Erred in Awarding Attorney's Fees Under Idaho Code Section 
12-120(3). 
The Browns argue that the district court's decision to avvard the Browns their attorney's 
fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) was supported by substantial and competent evidence and 
therefore should be affirmed. The Browns are \\Tong. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) allows for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in a 
civil action to recover "in any cOlIDnercial transaction." A cOIID11ercial transaction includes all 
transactions except those for personal or household purposes. Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 
152 Idaho 741, 755-756, 274 P.3d 1256, 1270-1271 (2012); Idaho Code § 12-120(3). In order 
for a transaction to be considered commercial, each party to the transaction must enter the 
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transaction for a commercial purpose. Carrillo 1'. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 756, 274 
P.3d 1256, 1271 (2012). 
Here, the Respondent's Brief pp. 39-40. sets forth in bullet point format examples that 
they believe support a finding that Greenheart had a commercial transaction. For example, the 
BroVd1s rely on the fact that Greenheal1 never lived on the propeny. Greenheart wanted land with 
low taxes, and at the time she purchased the property she knew she couldn't build a house on. 
None of those facts establish that Greenheart did not have a household or personal purpose. As 
stated in her Appellant's Brief at pages 29-30, the Greenheart never testified that she intended to 
'invest' in property. In fact, she testified that when she was looking for property in Idaho she 
wanted to live here: 
Mr. Dvorak: And isn't it true that when you were looking 
for property in Idaho, you thought you might \\'ant to live 
here again? 
:\is. Greenheart: Yes. I still am entertaining that idea. 
Mr. Dvorak: And you mentioned vacant land as part of 
the instructions that you gave to the Realtor? 
Ms. Greenheart: Yes, and also a low tax, annual tax. 
[March 5-6, 2013 Trial Transcript; Tr. pg. 130, 1. 12 thm pg. 131, 1. 4]. Thus, Greenheart's 
purpose for purchasing the land was for personal and household purposes. 
The evidence that Greenheart changed the classification of the land to dry grazing and 
that she entered into a dry grazing lease does not establish a cOlmnercial transaction. The 
testimony at trial clearly establishes that Greenheart was not running a cOlm11ercial cattle grazing 
operation but that she took those steps to reduce her property taxes and nothing more. See. 
[March 5-6, 2013 Trial Transcript; Tr. pp. 257-262]. Thus, the district court's reliance on that 
evidence to find a cOlmnercial transaction was erroneous. 
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In order for a transaction to be considered commercial, each party to the transaction must 
enter the transaction for a conunercial purpose. Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 
274 P.3d 1256, 1271 (2012). There is no evidence to supp011 the district cou11's conclusion 
that the Browns entered into the PSA \vith Greenheart for a commercial purpose. In fact, the 
district cou11 specifically held "there was no testimony at trial directly addressing the Plaintiff's 
purpose for listing the sixty acres for sale" lMemorandum Decision and Order Granting In Part 
Plail1t~ff's Fees and Costs p. 10; [R. Vo. III, p. 618]. The district cou11 attempted to look at the 
Browns' use of land prior to selling it to Greenheart as a basis for finding a conm1ercial 
transaction. That is a clear enor of la\v. As set f011h in Carillo each paI1y must "enter the 
transaction" for a commercial purpose. W11at the Bro\vns did with their property in the past does 
not automatically prove that the Browns had a conunercial purpose for entering into the PSA. 
Since the Brovms failed to provide evidence of their commercial intent for selling the property, 
the district C0U11 en-ed in concluding that the gravamen of this lawsuit was a conunercial 
transaction. 
J. The Browns Are Not Entitled To Attorney's Fees And Costs On Appeal 
The Browns argue that attorney's fees and costs are awardable to them if they prevail on 
appeal on the theory that: (1) this is a commercial transaction and therefore, attomey' s fees and 
costs are awardable under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and; (2) paragraph 9 of the PSA provides that 
attomey's fees and costs be awarded to the prevailing party on appeal. 
First, the Browns should not be awarded attorney's fees and costs under either basis 
because they will not be the prevailing party in this appeal. Second, if the Browns prevail on 
appeal. attorney's fees and costs canl10t be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) because this is 
not a commercial transaction as explained in Section VI of Appellant's Brief 
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Lastly. Paragraph 9 of the PSA does not provide a basis for awarding attomey's fees in 
this appeal. Paragraph 9 provides: 
If either party initiates or defends any arbitration or legal 
action or proceedings which are in any way cOlmected with 
this Agreement. the prevailing party shall be entitled to 
recover ti'om the non-prevailing party reasonable costs and 
attorney's fees. including such costs and fees on appeal. 
Plaintiff s Exhibit 6. 
The plain language of this paragraph contemplates awarding attomey's fees and costs for 
any action where the gravamen of the lawsuit is the PSA itself. Paragraph 9 does not 
contemplate an action regarding a dispute over \vhether a warranty deed was mistakenly 
prepared. This is particularly the case here \vhen considering the Doctrine of Merger which holds 
that "[ w Jhen a deed is delivered and accepted as performance of the contract to convey, the 
contract is merged in the deed. Though the terms of the deed may vary from those contained in 
the contract, the deed alone must be looked to detern1ine the rights of the parties .... " Capstar 
Radio Operating Co. v. LaHTence, 143 Idaho 704, 710, 152 P.3d 575, 581 (2007). Since the 
gravamen of this lawsuit ended up being \vhether there was a mistake in the preparation of the 
Warranty Deed. Paragraph 9's attorney fees provision is inapplicable to this appeal and is not a 
basis for awarding attorney fees on appeal. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in Greenheart's Appellants' Brief, the district court's 
judgment should be vacated. 
DATED this day of January, 2014. 
Borton Lakey Law Offices 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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